The cultural code of modernity and the problem of nature: a critique of the naturalistic notion of progress by Eder, Klaus
www.ssoar.info
The cultural code of modernity and the problem
of nature: a critique of the naturalistic notion of
progress
Eder, Klaus
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerksbeitrag / collection article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Eder, K. (1990). The cultural code of modernity and the problem of nature: a critique of the naturalistic notion of
progress. In J. C. Alexander, & P. Sztompka (Eds.), Rethinking progress : movements, forces and ideas at the end of
the 20th century (pp. 67-87). Boston: Unwin Hyman. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-15182
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Eder * The cultural code of modernity *  1  
 
 
                                                
THE CULTURAL CODE OF MODERNITY AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURE 
A CRITIQUE OF THE NATURALISTIC NOTION OF PROGRESS1 
 
 
Klaus Eder 
European University Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of contents: 
 
1 THE PROBLEM OF NATURE.............................................................................................................   2 
 
2 DISENTANGLING RATIONALITY FROM PROGRESS..........................................................................   4 
2.1 The Marxian heritage ................................................................................................................   4 
2.2 The Weberian radicalization of Marx.......................................................................................   6 
 
3 A THEORETICAL REORIENTATION: TWO TYPES OF MODERNITY.....................................................   7 
3.1 Reconstructing the code of European culture...........................................................................   7 
3.1.1 Two cultural traditions ...........................................................................................................   7 
3.1.2 Two conceptions of nature in modern culture .......................................................................   9 
3.2 Two cultures in modern culture ...............................................................................................  12 
3.2.1 Contradictory discourses in modern culture .........................................................................  12 
3.2.2 Two cultural models of modernity........................................................................................  14 
 
4 REVISIONS OF THE NOTION OF PROGRESS.....................................................................................  15 
4.1 Bourgeois culture and progress................................................................................................  15 
4.2 The range of possible choices ..................................................................................................  17 
 
5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................  19 
 
REFERENCES....................................................................................................................................  20 
 
 
1 Thanks are due to Barbara Young who went through several versions of this paper trying to 
clarify the argument and to improve as much as it has been possible the "Germanic English" 
characteristic of the first versions of it. 
Eder * The cultural code of modernity *  1  
 
 
                                                
I. THE PROBLEM OF NATURE 
 
Our growing awareness of the worldwide ecological crisis has damaged, perhaps 
completely, our conviction in the rationality of modern society. Rationalization itself 
has come to sound increasingly negative as we disentangle it from the idea of prog-
ress. More and more, we are experiencing a deep ambivalence toward the model of 
rationalization that has underlies, accompanies and has directed European-type mod-
ernization processes.  
 
The challenge of the "problem of nature" contributes to a new understanding of the 
culture of modern society. It could even contribute to a fundamental revision of the 
code of modern culture. For it challenges the basic element of this code: the 
boundary between nature and culture. In acknowledging the problem of nature we 
are putting the symbolic foundations of modern culture at stake. Nature, traditionally 
seen as sharply separated from the world of culture, can no longer be considered as 
external and opposed to society. The relation between nature and culture has to be 
redefined and the cultural code of modern society reorganized.2 The problem of 
nature also sensitizes us to an ambiguity in the rationality ascribed to modern 
culture. It forces us to fully reevaluate the normative assumptions of modernity, even 
to redefine the progress that is supposedly its fruit. Thus the ecological crisis 
provides an opening for ideas (and movements as carriers of these ideas) that define 
rationality differently from the dominating one.  
 
Modern culture has so far been dominated by a conception of rationality that takes 
nature as a means to other ends. This rationality in fact excludes any moral consider-
ations from the realm of nature. By defining nature as the locus of the emotional, of 
the nonrational, or even the irrational, the subjugation of nature to ends defined by 
culture becomes the model of rationality. This is what disenchantment is about. 
Increasingly, there are reactions against this form of rationality. Radical new 
discourses on nature, both everyday and intellectual ones, plead for the repeal of 
"disenchantment", and call instead for "reenchantment". Reenchantment is played 
off against disenchantment, the core idea of rationalization. 
 
 
2 I have treated this topic at length in a book titled "The Socialization of Nature. Studies in the 
Social Evolution of Practical Reason" (Eder 1988). There I treat the "problem of nature" from a 
theoretical as well as historical and cultural anthropological point of view. Nature is seen a the 
basic element of the cultural code of a society. The notion of a cultural code can be traced back 
principally to Claude Lévi- Strauss. For its sociological application within a Parsonian framework 
see Münch (1986). 
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These allegedly "nonrational" or "irrational" discourses and ideas, thematizing "the 
other side of modernity"3, rely on a conception of practical reason that does not 
exclude moral considerations from the realm of nature. It is a practical reason based 
on a sympathetic identification with nature, on a quasi- social relation with nature. It 
is a practical reason compatible with a reenchanted nature. It is a practical reason 
that might even lead to an alternative form of rationality in modern society. Such a 
communicative conception of practical reason is opposed to the utilitarian concep-
tion of reason dominating the modern relationship with nature and shaping its 
modern culture. 
 
This modern duality in practical reason can be traced back to its Greek and Semitic 
origins. These cultural traditions represent two cultural codes, the one based on the 
myth of a bloody origin of humanity, the other based on the myth of a paradisiac 
origin. They represent a "bloody" culture and an "unbloody" culture that define the 
cultural universe we still live in. The "bloody" side could explain some of the cruel-
ties that were part of the rationalization process shaping modern society: cruelties 
against the human body, against animals, against nature as well as against culture.4 
This could explain the ambivalence of modern society toward rationalization, an 
ambivalence so deep seated that even Weber struggled with it, though inconclusive-
ly.5 
 
Expanding thus the notion of the cultural traditions that shape the European experi-
ence of modernization to include the unbloody as well as the dominant bloody one, 
we deliberately take into account counterprocesses that have inadequately been de-
scribed as "antimodernization" or "traditionalistic regressions". The new definition 
of the cultural code of modern society that ultimately emerges is not based on the 
notion of a culture beyond modernity (e.g. postmodernity), but rests on a broader 
notion of the culture of modern societies that dominate social evolution today.  
 
3 This is the way, Schäfer (1986) puts it. He points to ideas, scientific knowledge and social 
movements counter to the dominant modernity. Following this lead we do not plead for 
something beyond modernity, but for a notion of modernity that incorporates the protest against it 
as part of modernity. Eisenstadt (1986) argues similarly when criticizing modernization theory. 
4 Here I refer to historical experiences that are intimately related to the rise of modern society, 
above all to witch- hunting in 17th and 18th centuries and fascism in 20th century. It is difficult to 
exculpate modern society from these events without criticizing the very social and cultural condi-
tions that have led to or made possible such events. 
5 Here I refer to Weber's idea of the "battle of gods" that goes along with the formal rational-
ization of modern society. This quotation comes from Weber's famous speech on "Science as a 
Vocation" (Weber 1922, pp. 582-613). For a discussion see Schluchter (1988). See also below 
note 11. 
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II. DISENTANGLING RATIONALITY FROM PROGRESS 
 
 1. The Marxian heritage 
 
Let us start with a critical approach to describe the rationality constitutive for the 
progress of modern society: the Marxian approach. In Marx the close relationship 
between progress and the rationality built into the development of the forces of 
production is beyond question. That development, freed from the bonds of feudal 
relations of production, is foreseen as the mechanism that will eventually break apart 
the irrationality of the social relations of production in capitalism and generate 
rational ones.6 In the meantime, our experience of the development of the forces of 
production has indeed been that they are no longer blocked but actually fostered by 
the social relations of production. But the emancipatory effect is contrary to what 
Marx thought it would be.7 The development of the forces of production has 
contributed to legitimate the relations of production, whether capitalist or socialist. 
And it has reduced the relation to nature in modern society to a mere instrumental 
one. It has led to "progress" in the subjugation of nature, which is tantamount to 
"regress" in the social relations with nature. This double effect points to the limits of 
one of the most important images modern society has produced of itself: of the 
image of being a progressive society. 
 
 
6 This "mechanism" can be seen as neutral with respect to its outcome. But such an interpretation 
of Marx is - as I see it - inadequate. There is in Marx a conception of man's relation to nature that 
offers ultimately a "productivist" notion of rationality. See for this claim Eder (1988), pp. 30ff. 
See also Habermas' critique of Marx in Habermas (1979). Habermas' critique is insufficient 
because he substitutes the social relations of men among themselves for the basic relation of man 
to nature. This solution to the Marxian problem of nature separates two spheres of human action 
and thus overlooks the internal connections between both spheres of action. The problem of 
nature forces us to give up the idea that nature is subject to instrumental and culture to 
communicative action. 
7 This self-negating character of rationalization has been treated by Horkheimer and Adorno as 
the "Dialectic of Enlightenment" (Horkheimer/Adorno 1947). The domination of nature is seen as 
extending over society as a whole. The dialectic ends in the universal domination of instrumental 
reason. Reconciliation with nature ("Versöhnung mit der Natur") as mediated by esthetic forms is 
the only chance to escape instrumental reason. This idea found a politically radical expression in 
Marcuse (1963, 1967). For a systematic discussion of and a different solution to the "Dialectic of 
Enlightenment" see Habermas (1981), pp. 489ff. 
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It is in Marx' idea of how the forces of production develop that we find the key to the 
ambivalence of rationalization characteristic for modern society. This can be 
attributed to the questionable logic that a society free from domination can be based 
upon a nature dominated and defeated by this society. To the extent that the 
rationalization of society is seen as being dependent upon developing forces (!) of 
production, the idea of a rational society is bound to a utilitarian type of practical 
reason. In order to go beyond this restricted notion of practical reason we must start 
to redefine the relationship of society with nature beyond the idea of "forces" of 
production. Looking at it as a symbolically mediated relationship will enable us to 
elaborate the idea of a social relation with nature as a model for other types of 
practical reason constitutive for the social relations, be they of production, exchange 
or consumption.8 
 
Going beyond the perspective inherited from Marx we can reconstruct the theoreti-
cal idea of forces of production as a cultural category, as a specifically defined 
cultural form of appropriating nature. Then we can extend our notion of a social 
relation to nature and see the basic forms of social life from production to con-
sumption as being determined by specific cultural definitions of that relation to 
nature.  
 
The way societies in history manifest this varies. But modern societies surpass most 
other societies in applying the crudest form of a social relation to nature: that of an 
instrumental use of nature. Nature is nothing but an object. Modern society belittles 
as primitive the opposite attitude, that of treating nature as a person, and claims 
"progress" for this version of relating to nature. Increasingly, however, it appears to 
be bound to a process of self-destruction which is in turn destructive to the notion of 
progress built into the cultural code of modern societies. 
 
Correcting this perspective has become the more urgent the more the development of 
modern society runs into the ecological crisis that threatens its further material repro-
duction. Progress must be disentangled from the idea of subjugating nature. Instead, 
the idea of progress must develop in a way that relinquishes that subjugation. We 
have to go beyond Marx. 
 
8 Such a relationship with nature has normally been associated with some kind of romanticism or 
even irrationality and therefore been excluded from scientific discourse. This might explain why 
the problem of nature does not exist in the social sciences. It has been left - as something exotic - 
to cultural anthroplogy and recently to the history of mentalities. For an interesting cultural 
anthropological treatment see Douglas (1966, 1975). For a historical account see Thomas (1983). 
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 2. The Weberian radicalization of Marx 
 
The usual proposition is to look at Max Weber. Yet Weber's work is only a radical-
ization of Marx, generalizing it by assessing rationalization from the point of view of 
the universalization of formal rationality.9 Weber's concept of rationalization refers 
above all to calculability. His analyses of bureaucracy and law, of economic life and 
religious ideas, are impressive pieces of historical work and interpretation. His 
scrutiny even includes those phenomena opposed to the incarnations of rationality in 
formal organization and formal law, in modern economy and modern culture. But 
they are treated as "aberrations" from the ideal path of formal rationalization seen as 
constitutive for modern society. He subsumes these aberrations under the heading of 
material rationality10 which is then nothing but an illegitimate child of formal 
rationality. 
 
Weber's religious studies do not hinder him from seeing modern culture as the apo-
theosis of formal rationality.11 He is convinced that the logic of formal rationaliza-
tion is inevitable in modern society. He is not unaware of its costs. His metaphor of 
the "iron cage" describing the outcome of formal rationalization and his metaphor of 
the "new polytheism" deriving from formal rationalization suggest that formal 
rationalization inevitably leads to irrationality. But these scarce hints are insufficient 
grounds for crediting Weber with exposing the ambivalence of modern culture.  
 
 
9 For this notion of rationality in Weber see especially Schluchter (1981). The model from which 
Weber has taken the structure of formal rationality is modern positive law. Its rationality lies not 
in its ability to produce justice but in its ability to produce comparable and calculable results. 
10 Habermas (1981) claims that there is no concept of formal rationality that does not imply some 
minimal material assumptions. Therefore the distinction between formal and material rationality 
is only a matter of relativity. This point was already made by Marx who showed that the formal 
rationality of modern law presupposes assumptions about subjective rights (e.g. property rights) 
and the modern fundamental rights of freedom. 
11 Weber's central problem is to show how even religious traditions helped shape the form of 
rationality prevalent in modern European culture (Weber 1920). His theoretical strategy 
contributes to underestimating competing cultural traditions, and it explains the irritations Weber 
runs into when he examines the cultural developments of his times. For an interesting analysis of 
Weber's sociology of religion and its relation to the new "battle of gods" see Schluchter (1988). 
For an extension of this Weberian program see Eisenstadt (1986). 
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We really need to start fresh. We have to reconstruct anew the traditions modern 
culture is made of and determine their relative influence. This will not (and cannot) 
be done here. But we can point to the different traditions that merge within modern 
European culture and their consequences, both manifest and latent, for coexisting 
and sometimes competing strategies of conceptualizing nature. We can sketch the 
programmatic of a new look at the culture of modernity, a look forced upon us by 
the problem of nature. 
 
III. A THEORETICAL REORIENTATION: TWO TYPES OF MODERNITY 
 
 1. Reconstructing the code of European culture 
 
  A. Two cultural traditions 
 
The roots of the ambivalence of modern culture can be found in the Greek and 
Jewish history that, through the Christianization of Europe, constitutes our cultural 
heritage. A unique blend of two traditions whose internal contradictions are com-
plementary, modern culture has developed the alternative options available within 
them according to the Greek model.  
 
Ancient Greek society was characterized by a model of political domination legiti-
mized by extensive bloody sacrificial rites. These sacrificial Delphic rites represent 
the real symbolic base of the society. The political system was held together pri-
marily by this symbolic code and only secondarily by its democratic ideology (in 
fact an intellectual invention of later Greek history!).  
 
Good evidence for the dominance of the bloody model underlying Greek culture 
comes from the cultural orientations of those social groups opposed to it. Most 
important were Pythagorean groups who defined themselves by their vegetarianism, 
a value orientation clearly opposed to the bloody rituals. Vegetarianism can be seen 
as a symbolic rejection of the dominant culture. Logically, persecuting these vege-
tarian groups became the way to reinstate the dominant culture.12 
 
 
12 This short analysis refers to recent research on Greek society that goes beyond the classic 
euphemisms. Classical Greece consisted not only of some philosophers but also of a political 
system that has had a decisive influence upon the history of political domination in Europe. It 
was by isolating the Greek philosophical traditions from their social and political context that the 
idea of the Greek miracle became possible. But this obscured the understanding of the effects of 
this type of thinking. We can do better when we try to understand the social and political context 
within which this thinking arose, to which it reacted and which it helped to rationalize. For the 
literature used see especially Detienne (1972, 1979a, 1979b) and Vernant (1971, 1979). 
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Jewish society on the other hand was characterized by a cultural code that succeeded 
in institutionalizing cultural restrictions upon its forms of political domination. This 
was the decisive difference between the Jews and their neighbors. The non-sacrifice 
of Isaac is one of the myths marking the historical point when the Jews began 
abstaining from human sacrifice even while their neighbors continued to practice it. 
Increasingly the Jews restricted the shedding of blood. This restriction was 
rationalized by the recourse to the ideal of a non-bloody paradise in society. Because 
in reality it was impossible to completely circumvent bloodshed, rules of ritual 
purity became enormously important. These rules put strong limits upon the practice 
of bloody sacrifice and other practices concerned with animals and other forms of 
nature. The rules became more and more complicated as social life increased in 
complexity. The unique canon of dietary prohibitions and rules characteristic for 
Jewish society thus represents a cultural tradition that tries to limit the opportunity of 
using an Other (be it human, be it animal, be it nature as such) as a mere object. It 
favors instead a culture that puts symbolic limits upon such uses.13 
 
Jewish obsession with ritual purity explains why its political society never really 
developed the social dynamism characteristic of Greek or Roman society. Yet, the 
code had tremendous cultural validity. Intervention from outside could not change it. 
The Jews were never mobilized by political elites the way neighboring societies 
were. The Romans knew why they were trying to force the Jews to eat pork. It 
would have been the best way to destroy the symbolic basis of the culture. The early 
Christians also belong within this cultural code. The Romans saw them to be a 
radical Jewish sect. The cultural basis of their persecution was - like the persecution 
of the Jews later in European culture - rooted in the cultural divide that distinguished 
them from and even opposed them to the bloody tradition of Greco-Roman culture.14 
 
13 The ritualistic character of Jewish culture has often been emphasized. But the meaning of this 
ritualism has normally been missed, to be "explained" by religion in what amounts to a 
tautological explanation. But religion does not "explain" the meaning; it arranges and rearranges 
the content that gives meaning to rituals. In this sense religion is a (mytho-)logical system giving 
coherence to myths that rationalize ritual action. In Jewish society the main myth is that of the fall 
from paradise and the resultant longing for a world without blood. Judging the real world from 
the angle of the paradisiac ideal structured norms and values that guide social action (cf. Eder 
1988, pp. 200ff.). It led to the preoccupation with blood and gave rise to rules of purity that allow 
for addressing the problem of blood. The "purity" of the unbloody state of nature then was 
extended into rules for the most elementary daily activities, especially eating. For an analysis of 
the ritual rules of eating from this point of view, especially the eating taboos, see Eder (1988), pp. 
127ff. 
14 There were attempts in ancient Israel to challenge the ritual foundation of political domination 
by challenging the religious authorities upholding the code. Attempts by some political leaders to 
bring about polytheistic "regressions" (allowing for a return to the bloody sacrifice) and to adapt 
Jewish political society to the model characteristic of their neighbours generally failed. For more 
details see Eder (1988), pp. 200ff. 
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Thus the cultural code of Europe has a complex heritage. On the one hand we have 
the Greeks, a society that mobilized its social, economic and political dynamic by 
putting rather loosely structured controls upon the use of power. On the other hand 
we have the Jews, a society that integrated its economic, political and social dynamic 
into a cultural world that put rigid limits upon the use of power. The Greek model 
became the dominant model shaping the development of European society. The 
Jewish model contradicting it has always been circumscribed and ghettoized or been 
persecuted.15 
 
The analysis of this double tradition allows us to broaden our conception of the 
cultural code underlying European culture. Both the dominant and the latent tradi-
tions have contributed to the process of modernization. Christianity, as the symbolic 
system mediating between and blending these two traditions, has not only repro-
duced but even intensified this strange constellation of two codes in one culture. The 
cyclical outbreaks of protest and rebellion, of "heterodoxy", in Christian culture can 
be seen as attempts to reverse the relationship between the two cultural codes. The 
movements associated with for example St. Francis and John Hus are carriers of a 
cultural orientation opposed to that institutionalized in Christian culture.16 
 
This dynamic of European culture has had costly effects. Its history is the history of 
suppressing the alternative tradition within modern culture. The persecutions of 
heretics, of witches, of the Jews are - added to the destructiveness of the religious 
wars - proof of it. The alternative tradition has therefore remained - due to bloody 
force - part of a "collective unconsciousness".17 Now, however, the dominant 
 
15 The social fate of Jewish culture within European culture is revealing. The aggressions against 
and persecutions of the Jews in European society through to modern times can be explained from 
the structural location of this cultural tradition within European culture: representing the model 
opposed to that dominant in this culture. 
16 The literature on messianic movements in medieval culture is abundant. An interesting case is 
that of the early heretics, especially the Cathars, who thought salvation consisted in escape from 
flesh. Mistrust of flesh is the most basic characteristic of this heretic tradition. The procreation of 
flesh and the consumption of its products (meat, milk, eggs) were bad, part of the kingdom of evil 
(Moore 1975). For later heretics continuing this tradition see Leff (1967). For a general 
macro-sociological account of the role of such movements see Eisenstadt (1982). In order to 
reconstruct such symbolic systems we have to go behind the intellectual and theological disputes. 
These disputes were - beyond their manifest content - carriers of a latent content, representing 
and rationalizing the two opposed and antagonistic cultural traditions analyzed above. 
17 They have entered into and been fostered in the course of European history as conscious move-
ments of protest against modernity and modernization. The history of cultural movements outside 
the main stream of political and economic development has only recently become the topic of 
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cultural tradition has come increasingly under attack as incapable of grasping the 
problems it produces, above all the problem of nature. This process forces modern 
society to confront the other cultural tradition that up to now has remained outside 
the discourse about modernity and modernization. The "collective unconsciousness" 
has begun to be publicly discussed and collectively shared. The effects of this 
process of discovering and uncovering a latent tradition upon the cultural evolution 
of modernity cannot be exaggerated. They will certainly change modern culture. 
 
 
  B. Two conceptions of nature in modern culture 
 
The problems modern society has run into in its relation with nature have ended the 
latency of its "other" tradition, the one deriving from Jewish culture. This second 
tradition proposes solutions to the "problem of nature" incompatible with those of 
the first one. The problem of nature has made us aware of the basic and elementary 
opposition of Greek and Jew. 
 
Looking into the two traditions we can find two conceptions of nature rationalizing 
two contradictory ways of relating to it. The Greek tradition utilized nature without 
restrictions. Nature (like a sacrificial animal) was not only an object of politics. It 
was treated as a means to other, namely human ends. The logic of this coding, 
permitting the shedding of blood without any cultural restriction, underlies the 
dominant relationship with nature in modern society. The Jewish tradition on the 
other hand restricted the use of bloody rituals by binding the sacrificial acts to the 
model of a paradisiac state of nature. The ritual rules of purity were attempts to 
reinstate at least partially the Biblical paradise where men and nature were subject to 
a higher law and lived together in peace. This coding implied a relationship with 
nature whose logic is defined by a harmonious or peaceful relation with nature. 
Nature is defined in such a way that limits its use as such by human beings.18 Thus 
we can describe the basic code of European culture as one pulled between a bloody 
model, derived from the code of Greek city state, and an unbloody countermodel, 
derived from the Jewish code of ritual purity. These two roots still operate on a basic 
structural level, each defining a different relation of man to his outer world, to 
nature. This duality shows us again the deep ambivalence built into our culture. 
 
scientific historical research. Concerning the research on protest and movements and its 
implication for the theory of modernization see Eisenstadt (1981, 1986). 
18 This takes up the argument made above with respect to these traditions. In the following the 
consequences of the opposition of nature and culture for the conception of nature will be empha-
sized. See Soler (1979) and, building upon Soler, Eder (1988). 
Eder * The cultural code of modernity *  1  
 
 
                                                
The key to modern rationality nevertheless remains the Greek code. The category 
"poiein" (the work of the artisan) that Greek culture differentiated from and favored 
over the category of "prattein" (the work of the peasant) indicates the direction of the 
Greek cultural outlook: The proper relation with nature was not praxis, but poiesis.19 
Nature was material to be shaped by man. The normative implication is far-reaching: 
by defining nature as a material we have been able to operate on it without limits, to 
even engage in a bloody relationship. The history of European civilization can be 
seen as an attempt to channel this bloody interaction by rationalizing and civilizing 
its "manners".20 But it has not changed the code of this culture that favors the 
unlimited use of nature, non-living and living alike. 
 
With this cultural code in mind as a background, it becomes easier to understand 
some practices and movements in European history based on a different relation to 
nature and that today manifest on a much broader scale within the ecological mood 
and movements. We can decipher a cultural meaning in romantic love for animals, 
in modern vegetarian movements, and in animal rights movements.21 As part of a 
counterculture movement, provoked and suppressed at the same time by the domi-
nant culture, these have been the social carriers of the latent alternative tradition of 
relating to nature. Today they are becoming the key to a new, spreading type of 
rationality in modern society.  
 
Until the 20th century this counterculture existed only in discrete social niches, 
either persecuted or scorned. But as the problem of nature has become more insistent 
this old counterculture tradition, which in fact offers an alternative to the most 
pressing problem of modern societies, has assumed new life. This tradition lies at the 
 
19 This difference taken from Greek philosophical thinking points to an ambivalence inherent in 
Greek culture. The "poietic" tradition was favored via its elementary cultural codings. But at the 
same time the cognitive means criticizing it was developed by elaborating the concept of 
"praxis". The latter concept has influenced different strands of modern social thought, from the 
early Karl Marx to Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas and (in a different way) Pierre Bourdieu. 
For a discussion of this difference see Eder (1988), pp. 306ff. 
20 One example is the development of the knife and fork for eating meat! See Elias (1971). This 
rationalization can be seen as an attempt to generalize the dominant code of modern culture on 
the level of everyday life. 
21 These phenomena have gained increasing attention in the last few years. For some German 
contributions see e.g. Schimank (1983), Sprondel (1986), Weiβ (1986), Hepp (1987) and Eder 
(1988), pp. 225ff., 256ff. For important earlier works see Honigsheim (1956) and Gusfield 
(1966). I would like to call the carriers of such discourses cultural movements thus distinguishing 
them from social movements constitutive for the rationalism (and rationalization) of modern 
culture. Here I adopt Touraine's idea of social movements as the "producers" of modern society 
(Touraine 1977, 1981). At the same time I try to extend it to include the cultural movements up to 
now at the margin of the historical process in such a theory of the "self-production of society". 
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base of what we call the ecological movement.22 This new movement is a cultural as 
well as a social movement. As a social movement it continues the conception of 
"material" rationality of the old social movements, the working class movements and 
the bourgeois movements. As a cultural movement it goes beyond this rationality 
and pleads for a rationality that puts into question not only the social relations of 
production, domination and consumption, but also the symbolic forms serving as the 
medium of these social relations. It pleads not for social relations that correspond to 
some criteria of justice, but for social relations that correspond to some criteria of 
purity (Eder 1989). Thus changing the symbols that allow for symbolically mediated 
communication, the ecological movement is transforming the cultural underpinnings 
of social life in modern society. It is here the possibilities for a type of 
communicative practical reason have to be sought. 
 
 
 2. Two cultures in modern culture 
 
  A. Contradictory discourses in modern culture 
 
As we have seen, modern culture contains two competing conceptions of nature. Let 
us now focus on a theoretical description of the cultural code specific to modern 
society. To describe this double code three pairs of conceptual oppositions will be 
used: (1) rationality and romanticism, (2) evolution and equlibirium, and (3) 
utilitarian and communicative reason.  
 
A first opposition contrasts ways of perceiving and experiencing nature. Rationality 
comprises orientations toward nature that value efficiency in some form or other. 
Romanticism rejects these orientations, basing its understanding of nature upon 
norms taken not from logical insight, but from intuitive knowledge.23 The two 
 
22 There is no consensus concerning the usage of the term "ecological movement". For the most 
common use of the term see in Germany Brandt (1982) and Brandt et al (1983). I restrict my use 
of the term to those groups that are concerned about the destruction of the natural environment 
(e.g. pollution) by political and economic institutions and organizations but not by the people that 
consume nature. In this sense the ecological movement is primarily a "social" movement. The 
modern natural food movement (from vegetarian to healthy food groups) is not a social 
movement but a "cultural" movement. Therefore I would like to distinguish between the 
ecological movement and the alternative nutrition movement pointing to the difference in the way 
the social movement and the cultural movement thematize the relationship of men with nature. 
See Eder (1988), pp. 256ff. An example for such a cultural movement within the ecological 
movement is the "deep ecology movement. For a discussion of its ambiguities see Luke (1988). 
23 Romanticism thus appears as a tradition that continues - mediated and fostered by the "Greek" 
tradition of the Enlightenment - a relationship with nature that is to be found in the Jewish 
heritage. This interpretation allows us to see Romanticism as being more than a mere reaction to 
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orientations are tied to two differentiated spheres of value: the cognitive and the 
esthetic. The first has been embodied in modern science, the second in modern art. 
The rationalist- scientific conception reduces nature to what can be experienced by 
the senses and deduced from sensual experience through theoretical reasoning. The 
romanticist-esthetic conception extends the range of experiences of nature beyond 
the scope of science. Its experiences are therefore found in esthetic forms rather than 
in the form of scientific discourse. 
 
A second opposition thematizes the time dimension underlying modern relationships 
of nature with culture.24 This relationship can be seen as one of evolution or as one 
of an equilibrium, as one based on a linear time conception or as one based on a 
cyclical time conception. The idea of evolution has played an important ideological 
function in the self-description of modern society. Referring to a "scientific" 
conceptualization of social development, it has simultaneously fulfilled ideological 
functions while legitimating the superiority and expansion of modern Western 
culture. From the evolutionary perspective, nature is an object upon which selective 
pressures exerted by human society act to shape and change its forms. The net result 
of such pressures is adaptive advances toward a greater control of nature. This 
process is seen as unavoidable.  
 
The idea of an equilibrium between society and nature can be traced back to the 
image of a natural state. Its most simple version is a return to nature, widespread in 
romantic thinking. But there are other variations, based on as many equilibria as 
there have been paths of history. These equilibria are not identical with a natural 
the Enlightenment (e.g. Timm 1978). Rather, it can be seen as an attempt to create a more 
comprehensive Enlightenment. This is possible when we see Romanticism as a movement 
resulting from a different strand of European culture trying to adapt to the exigencies of modern 
life. For a classic sociological discussion of Romanticism as a cultural movement see Honigsheim 
(1956). For a more recent treatment see Weiβ (1986). Campbell (1987) shows that romanticism 
contains an ethic that has decisively shaped the modern "spirit of consumerism". The emphasis on 
consumerism is another way of correcting the productivist conception of modern culture inherited 
from Marx. And a sociological analysis of the romantic tradition is one means to do so. The 
consequence of such an approach is a closer look at the symbolic constructions underlying our 
forms of consuming nature - and here the Jewish tradition offers a way to criticize the mere 
instrumentalist approach to our ethic of consumption. 
24 The opposition between nature and culture can be solved by "temporalization" in two ways. 
First there is the possibility of advancing from nature to culture. This can be called the "pro-
gressistic optimism" of modern culture. Then there is the possibility of returning from culture to 
nature. This has been a general topos of cultural critique in modern culture (and Rousseau is only 
the most famous representative of this type of thinking). Such temporalizations again point to the 
two competing traditions modern culture carries. For an interesting discussion of different 
conceptions of time within European culture see Wendorff (1975). 
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state but represent different culturally defined states of the relation of society to 
nature. The equilibrium that allows for the reproduction of society in nature depends 
upon the cultural form society gives to its natural environment. This idea of an 
equilibrium presupposes an interactive relationship between society and nature, thus 
expanding the one- way relationship characteristic for the idea of an evolution based 
on the increasing mastery of nature by society. Uniting both aspects it arrives at a 
conception where nature and society evolve together, a process mediated by culture. 
 
A third opposition derives from differing a priori assumptions about practical reason. 
Utilitarian reason is strategic, calculating the effects of the use of nature upon 
nature. It dominates the economic ideology of of modern society. Communicative 
reason on the other hand treats nature as a symbolic good and restricts the uses of 
nature to what can be justified on moral grounds. This type of relation with nature is 
encouraged be the new counterculture. As it acts upon nature, practical reason can 
vary between two extremes. One extreme applies a utilitarian ethic and the other an 
ethic of upholding universal a priori principles. Thus when speaking of practical 
reason we need to distinguish between two interpretations. 
 
The utilitarian interpretation idealizes the "rational man" freed from social and 
cultural restraints and mobilizing his self- interests. This concept has become the 
point of reference for the "formal" rationality of this society. The communicative 
interpretation idealizes an interactive mankind composed of equals free to air their 
differences. This form of practical reason has partially succeeded in the political 
realm (where is has been incorporated into human rights advocacy or in the moral 
idealism of cosmopolitanism) and, as Habermas for example claims, in private 
bourgeois life, in the modern familiy. Both are seen as embodiments of communi-
cative practical reason, whereas the economic and the administrative system are seen 
as bound to the dominant strategic or utilitarian type.25 Both models of rationality 
can be identified in modern society. They become manifest when the two cultural 
models of relating to nature come into direct confrontation.  
 
Logically speaking, the ecological movement can stimulate both models. Ecological 
thinking can be considered the most advanced version of the dominant utilitarian 
 
25 Here I refer to Sahlins' work on "Culture and Practical Reason" (1976) which uses "practical 
reason" in the sense it has been used in modern society, i.e. in the utilitarian sense. Pointing this 
out Sahlins contributes to the de-illusioning of modern practical rationality. But he underrates the 
other meaning of practical rationality, one that is contained in modern society within the limits of 
the private and public realms. As long as decisions about the direction of social change are made 
outside these limits Sahlins's point is well taken. The meaning carried by the claim of practical 
rationality is a means of criticizing its more restricted version. The perception of this problem will 
be stimulated - and here I follow Sahlins without hesitation - by the definition and redefinition of 
our relationship to nature, by the way we consume nature. 
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mind, a radicalization of modern economic ideology. But ecological thinking can 
also stimulate the counterculture tradition. This potential for ambivalence within the 
ecological movement is represented today e.g. in the split between the "realistic 
ecologists" and the "deep ecologists".  
 
As ecological problems have increased and attitudes that were once latent gained 
respect, a dual relation to nature within the cultural code of modernity has come to 
light. The price has been an unequivocal notion of modernity. We are presently left 
with the phenomenon of two cultures in one culture, of two definitions of modernity 
within modernity. The theoretical puzzles thus produced still await resolution. 
 
 
  B. Two cultural models of modernity 
 
It is the conflicting conceptions of nature that give us the key to the most basic 
differences between the "two modern cultures". They are basic in the sense that they 
thematize the competing rationalities underlying these two cultures. The cultural 
rationalities at issue can be conceptualized as "culture as profit" and as "culture as 
communication" (Sahlins 1976; Leach 1976). Both rationalities can be seen as 
specific versions of practical reason. The one is the utilitarian version based upon 
the rationality of efficiency and maximization. The other is the communicative 
version based upon the rationality of equality and discursive argumentation. In terms 
of discourse theory the difference can be described as one between a monologue and 
a dialogue form of practical reason.26 
 
Thus we can now identify two forms of practical reason that determine the ratio-
nality of modern culture. Both utilitarian and communicative reason have been 
operative in the history of modern culture in Europe. The bourgeois culture of the 
18th and 19th century mixed these two rationalities and produced the illusion of one. 
The cultural changes brought about by the labor movement then separated them and 
 
26 This interpretation of competing concepts of rationality and reason is taken from the theory of 
communicative action. (Habermas 1981). In a reconstruction of political modernization in 19th 
century German society I have tried to develop systematically the idea of an egalitarian and 
discursive relationship as the organizing principle of modern civil society (Eder 1985). I differ 
from Habermas when defining the competing notions of rationality. Habermas opposes 
functionalist reason to communicative reason, an opposition that detracts our attention from those 
rationalities that determine actual social conflicts. The problem centers on how we try to organize 
and orient collective action in a given situation (or given systems of social action). The problem 
is to construct an adequate theory of practice. And here I propose the theoretical alternative to be 
between utilitarian and coommunicative rationality (Eder 1988). Sahlins (1976) and Leach (1976) 
seem to me to argue in the same way. These alternatives are themselves a manifestation of the 
double tradition characterizing the cultural heritage of modern society. 
Eder * The cultural code of modernity *  1  
 
 
left them without any systematic relationship. Now, the ecological crisis of 
present-day advanced industrial societies has made us aware that the cultures are 
dependent one upon another. This gives us a chance to escape both the illusionary 
18th century fusion and the realistic 19th century separation of these two rationali-
ties. And it forces us to find a new way of relating the two.  
 
The theoretical task before us then is to end the separation between the two cultures 
as it manifests itself in a dual social theory: one half concerned with the realm of 
strategic and utilitarian action and the other concerned with the realm of 
communicative action. We can no longer, as Habermas (1981) has proposed, 
separate two different social worlds by merely analytically distinguishing between 
system and life-world. Separating the two cedes the realm of nature to the systemic 
sphere dominated by the culture-as-profit orientation. Moreover, we have to ac-
knowledge that morality pervades the realm of nature as much as technology 
pervades the realm of men. This being so we can no longer separate two notions of 
progress in modern culture, the one defined as technological progress, the other as 
moral progress. They are indissolubly tied together. There is a problem, however, in 
how duplications of concepts key to the culture of modernity can be circumvented.  
 
The practical task before us is to criticize the use modern society has made of the 
notion of progress to describe its development. Having lost the faith in the progress 
we have made so far has rendered this self-description into illusion. We have to 
revise the notion of progress. It is the only way modern social science discourse can 
maintain its use in the self- description of modern society. 
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IV. REVISIONS OF THE NOTION OF PROGRESS 
 
 1. Bourgeois culture and progress 
 
The bourgeois culture of 18th and 19th century tried to fuse the utilitarian and com-
municative traditions of practical reason under the heading of progress. Tech-
nological progress and moral progress would be but two sides of one coin. Progress, 
realized through science and technology, would be a means of freeing society from 
the limitations of nature and thus contribute to the moral progress of mankind. This 
optimistic expectation of the culture of Enlightenment was based on the belief that 
everything that challenged traditional forms of belief, above all science and 
technology, contributed to the moral progress of mankind.  
 
Then, as the social thinkers of the 19th and early 20th centuries became aware of the 
negative social consequences of modernization they began to differentiate the 
conception of progress. Some challenged the inevitability of moral progress so 
self-evident to the Enlightenment. Marx was one of the most important of these 
critics. Moral progress was still not at hand; it was something society still needed to 
struggle for. This could be done in two ways: either by imposing morality "from 
above" or by claiming a morally better world "from below".27 Marx himself was 
ambivalent with respect to these options. But whatever the solution proposed, the 
progress ascribed to the development of the forces of production remained unques-
tioned. The mastery of nature still could serve as a model of social progress. Only a 
few challenged this idea. These critics were labeled "romantic". The justice of the 
utilitarian relationship with nature was simply too self- evident to modern society. 
No critique of the technological model of progress had any real chance under these 
historical circumstances. 
 
This situation has however changed. With the expansion of the ecological discourse 
the progressive character of our relation to nature is no longer self-evident and the 
rationality of that relation is now subject to challenge. The notion of progress, under 
increasing pressure since the coming of the ecological crisis, has become the central 
ideological and practical concern of advanced industrial societies. The new problem 
posed by the ecological crisis is not simply the problem of survival; it is the problem 
of a "reasonable" relation to nature. Now that even the notion of technological prog-
ress, that aspect of modernization that once seemed to be its most clear-cut 
 
27 This constitutes an interesting field of historico- sociological analysis. It involves undertaking 
historical comparisons of such strategies, and analyzing the social conditions and consequences 
of such strategies. I have tried this approach with the case of 19th century German society where 
in the second half of 19th century the imposition of moral progress from above became the 
dominant model of bringing about "moral progress". See Eder (1985). 
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advantage, causes cultural irritation, we can no longer assume an empirical basis for 
the idea of progress. Since claiming moral evolution causes similar irritations, 
progress seems to be a fiction. It would be easy to give up progress as a meaningful 
theoretical category and to relinquish it as a mere ideological category.  
 
But the idea of progress is more than an ideological force in modern society. It is a 
category that contains "counterfactual" postulates and is also used in this way. Prog-
ress is still considered to be something that has to be produced. We simply have to 
understand and analyze better. We need to understand its practical use beyond that 
classic situation where "natural progress" was a culturally shared idea. What we as 
sociologists can contribute to the analysis of the use of the notion of progress is to 
push the disturbing disillusion about "natural progress" into active "de-illusioning". 
We can  
- de-illusion the idea of a self-propelling progress in modern culture 
- de-illusion a unilinear progress 
- de-illusion European-type modernization as a model. 
 
This de-illusioning process has already been accomplished with respect to the idea 
of moral progress. We have research criticizing modernization theory as either 
ethnocentric or as inadequate to grasp pathological paths of modern development. 
But only when we criticize technological progress, this last bastion of self-evident 
progress, will the idea of progress begin to be freed from naturalistic fallacies. Then 
there will be nothing but a concept ready to be filled with meaning. The theoretical 
problem before us then is to relocate the idea of progress within the present social 
and cultural struggles and to define the limits of possible choices in such struggles. 
 
 2. The range of possible choices 
 
We are left with the thesis that after the loss of a substantive idea of progress the 
idea of progress is now open to cultural struggles to define and redefine its contents. 
As a corollary, the cultural traditions underlying modern European culture are in fact 
being used by competing and even antagonistic collective actors to give a new 
content to this idea. The analysis of such collective actors, of cultural movements, 
then becomes the key to explaining the fate of the notion of progress so central to the 
self-description of modern societies.  
 
Thus we have come to view progress as the "definitional" result of "symbolic strug-
gles" (Bourdieu 1984) in modern society. It turns out that the notion of progress is a 
means by which social actors try to influence social change. It is not inherent in 
modernization. It has no unequivocal validity. The notion of progress is a way of 
describing and validating an emerging cultural model. It refers to a field of social 
conflict between actors seeking to define the direction of social change. Within 
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social science discourse, such a theoretical idea can be found in the concept of a 
"self-production of society" (Touraine 1977).28 
 
But the range of possible notions of progress used to legitimize a cultural model of 
social development is not without limits. Combining two fields of human action 
(nature and culture) and two cultural orientations of human action (communicative 
action and utilitarian action) gives us four possibilities for the practical use of the 
notion of progress:  
-The first one is to restrict the notion of progress to the field of strategic/instrumental 
action. The idea of dominating nature then defines the rationality of cultural 
practices. This is the model that permeates modern societies.  
-The second one is to restrict the notion of progress to the field of moral action. 
Moral evolution is the privileged field of the idea of progress. This restriction ex-
cludes the relation of man to nature from the agenda of rational practice. This 
notion has become the model of the new humanist critique of the perversions 
encountered in modern societies. 
-The third one is to reduce the notion of progress in both dimensions to its function 
in the reproduction of social systems. Actors are the environment of social 
systems that behave like strategic actors. Such an idea can be found in Luhmann's 
system-theoretical approach. The reification of social practice here is worth a 
hard look because the collective experiences of the dominance of systems in 
modern societies foster such a conclusion.  
-The fourth one is to generalize moral action across nature and culture. This implies 
a form of practical reason in our relation to nature that allows us to re-couple 
technological and moral progress. This would involve changing some basic 
cultural conceptions of nature in order to be able to treat it according to some 
standards of a morally grounded practical rationality.  
 
The first two conceptualizations of progress are the classical ones claiming a 
"natural progress". They no longer work. The choice between technological progress 
in nature and moral progress in society is no longer operative. We can no longer 
equate technological and moral progress under the heading of formal rationality. But 
we can give both processes either a "strategic" or a "communicative" direction. The 
choice then can ultimately be reduced to the alternative between progress in the 
 
28 This discussion is the necessary follow-up to the type of cultural analysis I present. For after 
analyzing culture the interesting question becomes culture in action. We have treated progress as 
an expression of a dominating cultural tradition and now we arrive at a sociological treatment of 
progress as being the result of symbolic struggles the carriers of which are competing social and 
cultural movements. The theoretical efforts and disputes from Luhmann to Habermas and from 
Bourdieu to Touraine can be given a new objective meaning from this perspective. 
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dimension of "culture-as-profit" or in the dimension of "culture- as-communication", 
the third and fourth possibility above.  
 
The third possibility is probably an escapist strategy. It simply denies the construc-
tive aspects of collective communicative action and discourses. The idea of progress 
appears as nothing but an element in the "autopoiesis" of society (Luhmann 1984) 
and is thus an overtly ideological notion. The fourth possibility is the most 
promising as a starting point for disentangling the concept of rationality from the 
historical model of European- style progress based on the overpowering of nature. A 
way to scrutinize the historical possibility of such a concept is to analyze how 
present social struggles and discourses mobilize competing cultural traditions (the 
Greek and the Jewish) to produce competing definitions of progress. We do not need 
to give up the idea of progress. We simply need better theoretical tools for a 
sociological analysis of its use in modern society. The tools are there - we need only 
adapt and apply them.29 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The idea of progress has in recent years increasingly been put into question. The key 
experience contributing to disengaging the idea of progress from the idea of 
rationality has been the ecological crisis. This crisis has made modern culture look 
like it fosters a way of organizing social life that is self- destructive. The crisis has 
nourished cultural movements counter to modernization. There are groups and 
discourses, everyday ones and intellectual ones, that plead for reenchantment as 
opposed to disenchantment. Modern culture has started to react to this experience by 
putting into question its key concepts: rationalization and rationality. Modernization 
based on rationality appears to be only one of many alternative ways of organizing 
modern social life. It appears to be nothing but the social form forced upon the 
majority of societies in the world by a dominant European culture and its American 
and Russian derivatives. Modernity is a cultural force that has imposed upon us a 
form of social evolution that cannot control its own consequences. 
 
New, alternative ideas and movements are increasingly being directed against this 
type of modern rationality. These counterprocesses are not adequately described as 
antimodern or traditionalistic regressions. Instead, they represent another type of 
rationality and rationalization within the legacy of modern culture. The increasing 
 
29 To combine such different strands of theorizing within European sociology seems to me a 
promising effort. Europe, being that part of the world where the problem of nature was invented 
and radicalized, offers a context of social thought that can objectively confront and possibly treat 
the pressing new problems of advanced industrial societies. 
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concern with nature that we experience today is symptomatic of a fundamental 
cultural cleavage within the culture that underlies, accompanies and regulates the 
development of highly complex societies in European-type modernization processes.  
 
This cultural cleavage is traceable to the Semitic and Greek origins of modern 
culture. Two conflicting traditions, one of bloody sacrifice and one of unbloody 
(vegetarian!) paradise, still define the cultural universe within which we live. 
Expanding the notion of cultural traditions constitutive for the European experience 
of modernization and conceptualizing it as the manifestation of competing codes of 
modern culture, we are able to identify not one but two types of relationships with 
nature in modern society. Thus we arrive at two types of rationality encountered in 
modern culture: utilitarian rationality and communicative rationality, and at two 
types of culture within modern culture: culture as profit and culture as communica-
tion.  
 
Ultimately, we have the outline of a new theoretical notion of progress. It is one that 
puts into question any social theory premised on its own progressiveness in terms of 
the European version of progress. The current ecological crisis has destroyed the last 
bastion of the belief in natural progress, the mastery of nature. Social theory should 
continue the task of de- illusioning this self-ascription, of disengaging 
European-style progress from the notion of modernity. 
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